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ALD-054        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2472 
___________ 
 
DEXTER PICKETT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN MCKEAN FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00023) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 21, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  March 2, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Dexter Pickett, a federal inmate, appeals pro se from the order of United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his petition for writ of 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Pickett challenged the Bureau of 
Prison’s (“BOP”) calculation of his sentence.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6.   
On March 15, 2011, Pickett was arrested and charged in the New York Supreme 
Court in Westchester County with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.  
About four months later, Pickett was indicted in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.  On January 4, 2013, Pickett pleaded guilty to  
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance 
and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
846, 924(c)(1), in the Southern District of New York.  That same day, Pickett was 
sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 120 months of incarceration followed by four years 
of supervised release.  On January 17, 2013, Pickett was sentenced in state court to three 
and a half years of incarceration.  The state court directed that Pickett’s sentence run 
concurrently with his federal sentence.  From March 15, 2011, to March 6, 2014, Pickett 
was incarcerated in New York state facilities and subject to New York’s primary 
jurisdiction, but was transferred to federal custody pursuant to several writs of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum for his federal criminal proceedings.  
 On March 6, 2014, Pickett was paroled on his state sentence and was released to 
the BOP pursuant to a detainer.  Pickett requested that he receive credit for the time he 
was incarcerated in the state institution.  The BOP denied Pickett’s request.  After 
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exhausting his administrative remedies, Pickett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of Pennsylvania, where he was 
incarcerated.  The parties consented to proceeding before a Magistrate Judge and the 
matter was fully briefed.  The Magistrate Judge denied Pickett’s petition.  Pickett timely 
appeals.  
The District Court had jurisdiction over Pickett’s habeas petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005).  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s denial of 
his habeas petition de novo.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
The Attorney General, who acts through the BOP, has the authority to calculate a 
federal sentence and provide credit for time served.  United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 
329, 334-35 (1992).  In calculating a sentence, the BOP first determines when the 
sentence commenced and then determines whether the prisoner is entitled to any credits 
toward that sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3585.  The Magistrate Judge correctly upheld the 
BOP’s determination that Pickett’s federal sentence was to run consecutively to his state 
sentence.  Because the sentencing court did not order the federal sentence to run 
concurrently with Pickett’s yet to be imposed state sentence, the BOP was required to 
treat his federal sentence as running consecutively to his state sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively 
unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”); see also Elwell v. Fisher, 
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716 F.3d 477, 484 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that § 3584(a) requires state and federal 
sentences imposed at different times to run consecutively, unless the court orders the 
terms to run concurrently).   
The BOP was also correct in not awarding credit for time served by Pickett while 
on loan to federal authorities pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.  The 
production of a defendant pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not 
affect the jurisdiction of the sovereign with primary custody over a defendant.  Rios v. 
Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000) (“a prisoner detained pursuant to a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum remains in the primary custody of the first jurisdiction 
unless and until the first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over the prisoner.”); see also 
Crawford v. Jackson, 589 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“When an accused is 
transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum he is considered to be 
‘on loan’ to the federal authorities so that the sending state’s jurisdiction over the accused 
continues uninterruptedly.”).  New York had primary custody over Pickett and he has 
failed to show that New York relinquished custody of him during the time when he was 
on loan to federal authorities. 
We also agree with the BOP’s denial of credit toward Pickett’s federal sentence 
for the time he served in state custody before he was paroled to federal custody.  Section 
3585(b) prohibits the BOP from crediting a federal sentence with time that has already 
been credited toward another sentence.  See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 (“Congress made 
clear [in § 3585(b)] that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention 
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time.”).  Because Pickett received credit toward his state sentence for his time spent in 
custody from March 15, 2011, to March 6, 2014, he was not entitled to credit from the 
BOP for that time.   
Finally, the BOP did not abuse its discretion in denying Pickett’s request for nunc 
pro tunc designation.  The BOP has the authority to retroactively designate the place of 
confinement for a prisoner’s federal sentence.  18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).  The BOP may 
designate a state prison as the place of confinement and it has wide authority in making 
such a designation.  Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 235 (2012); Barden v. 
Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990).  As discussed by the Magistrate Judge, the 
BOP reviewed Pickett’s request under the factors stated in § 3621(b).  Specifically, the 
BOP contacted the federal court for input and considered the sentencing judge’s deferral 
to the discretion of the BOP.  The BOP also considered Pickett’s criminal history, which 
included convictions for attempted endangering the welfare of a child and possession of 
stolen property in addition to disciplinary infractions.  The BOP did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that Pickett’s criminal history, coupled with the sentencing 
judge’s silence, counseled against granting concurrency.  The BOP also considered the 
state court’s intention to have Pickett’s sentences run concurrently and the fact that 
Pickett’s state and federal charges were related.  However, as “neither the federal courts 
nor the [BOP] are bound in any way by the state court’s direction that the state and 
federal sentences run concurrently[,]” Barden, 921 F.2d at 478 n.4, we cannot conclude 
that the BOP abused its discretion in declining to implement the state court’s design.  The 
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BOP appropriately considered the relevant factors and its decision was not an abuse of 
discretion.    
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
